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The pharmaceutical industry has been in the spotlight for the last decades 
regarding some conflicting trends. Despite a consistent increase in research and 
development (R&D) investment, the number of approved drugs has remained, 
at most, constant. In addition, the pharma industry has witnessed a large trend 
in consolidation through mergers and acquisitions (M&As), which has not 
always translated in an improvement in R&D productivity. The aims of this 
paper are to study the effect of a pre-acquisition alliance on the R&D productivity 
of the merged firm, as well as looking at specific alliance characteristics that may 
influence this outcome. This study looks at the pharmaceutical industry from 
1981 to 2017 and finds that the existence of an alliance prior to a merger 
negatively affects the R&D productivity of the merged firm. Reasons for this 
relationship may be that the knowledge gained during the alliance period does 
not benefit the acquirer in a way that is significant enough to increase its R&D 
productivity, or even that this earned insight is not immediately reflected during 
the post-M&A period. The implications of these findings look to improve the 
understanding of the productivity crisis in the pharmaceutical sector. 
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The pharmaceutical industry has seen some incredible breakthroughs in its 
recent years. For example, drugs and vaccines protecting against malaria have 
saved around 1.14 million children between 2011 and 2015, deaths from measles 
in Africa have been reduced by 79% between 2000 and 2014, the industry has 
been the third largest contributor towards the R&D of neglected diseases, and 
the number of deaths arising from HIV/AIDS has decreased by more than 50% 
from 2005 to 2015 alone (IFPMA, 2017). However, the pharma sector has also 
undergone significant change over the past decades; from suffering productivity 
shocks, seeing its research and development costs for new molecular entities 
soar, facing expiration of key patents and witnessing a wave of consolidation in 
the sector. The average R&D cost of producing a new drug and placing it on the 
market is estimated to be around US$2.5 billion (2013 dollars) (DiMasi et al., 
2016), whereas the number of drugs that are approved for production are no 
higher this year than they were 50 years ago (Munos, 2009). 
In a knowledge and research-intensive industry such as the pharmaceutical 
industry, when faced with declining R&D efficiency, changes in the firms’ 
strategic outlook must be considered.  Moreover, innovation becomes more 
efficient when firms collaborate instead of working in isolated environments; not 
only because of the high costs involved in R&D, but also in testing, 
manufacturing, and marketing the drugs. For this reason, many multinational 
pharmaceutical companies are looking at creating growth options by engaging 
in mergers and acquisitions with (usually) smaller firms to improve declining 
drug pipelines. However, M&As are often associated with integration problems 
 
and cultural shocks (Thanos and Papadakis, 2012; Bauer and Matzler, 2014), 
which may not be desirable in the short-run. For this reason, firms look at 
establishing alliances and collaborations with other firms to improve their 
understanding of the targets’ assets, competencies and knowledge, due to the 
inherent difficulty in valuing these assets quantitatively (Kogut, 1991; Higgins 
and Rodriguez, 2006; Meschi et al., 2017). Balakrishnan and Koza (1989, p. 8) 
conclude in their study that, “the joint-venture affords opportunities for learning 
and gathering new information about the value of the partner’s assets”.  
Two key studies have found that declining product pipelines and 
deteriorating R&D productivity are main drivers for M&A activity. The first 
study looks at a sample of 160 pharmaceutical firms from 1994-2001 and find a 
positive relationship between deteriorating product pipelines and propensity to 
engage in an M&A (Higgins and Rodriguez, 2006). The second study finds that 
small and large firms use mergers in different situations. Whereas for large firms, 
mergers are used mainly as a response to patent expirations and declining 
pipelines; small firms use mergers as an exit strategy due to financial issues 
(Danzon et al., 2007). On the other hand, Porrini (2004) investigates the existence 
of a previous alliance between acquirer and target and investigates the effect it 
poses on post-acquisition performance. The author finds a positive relationship 
between the two variables.  
Currently, the most similar study to this one is that of Danzon et al. (2005, p. 
317), where it is found that products “developed in an alliance tend to have a 
higher probability of success”. Nevertheless, the period studied is limited to 
1988-2000 and there is no mention of the effect this has on the company’s R&D 
productivity. Therefore, following a similar line of thought, the aim of this paper 
is to investigate what effect a pre-acquisition alliance between two firms in the 
pharmaceutical industry has on the future R&D productivity of the combined 
firm. Compared to other studies, this paper offers a more thorough investigation 
 
due to the time period considered, 1981-2018. The goal of this paper is to fill an 
existing gap in the literature by focussing on a specific – pharmaceutical – 
industry to try and capture what effect collaborations (in the form of alliances) 
have on R&D. This paper then focusses on two alliance characteristics, namely 
alliance duration and number of drugs collaborated during the alliance, to try 
and capture more specific determinants of R&D productivity. 
There are several reasons for choosing the pharmaceutical industry for this 
study. Firstly, it is one of the most research-intensive industries in the world, and 
the most research intensive in the US (PhRMA, 2018). Secondly, it has been in the 
forefront of every wave of mergers and acquisitions; with a very strong trend of 
consolidation in the last decade. Lastly, it is an industry that features a high 
number of inter-firm collaboration, showing an increasing trend of alliances 
serving as a complement to mergers. For example, GlaxoSmithKline is allocating 
around 50% of its R&D budget to establishing alliances with partners from 
academia and with the biotechnology industry (Schuhmacher et al., 2016). 
The main findings in this study include the observation of a negative 
significant relationship between alliances and R&D productivity at the time of 
the merger. In other words, the existence of a pre-acquisition alliance leads to a 
decrease in R&D productivity for the merged firm. Furthermore, a negative 
significant relationship was also found between the duration (number of years) 
of an alliance and its effect on R&D productivity. Finally, the number of drugs 
collaborated between firms in an alliance prior to a merger was found to 
contribute negatively towards R&D productivity; however, this result was not 
found to be significant.  
As Ornaghi (2009) refers in his paper, it is impossible to exclude the possibility 
that any correlation that may arise from M&A outcomes is due to sources of 
unobservable factors. For example, if the reason behind the decision of a firm to 
merge is due to an anticipation of poor financial performance, the analysis in this 
 
paper may not be picking out the effects of the merger. Instead, this paper follows 
the assumption that alliances established prior to a merger or acquisition allowed 
the acquiring firm to gain an insight into its target’s characteristics, that would 
not be possible otherwise. 
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Chapter 2 presents the 
theoretical assumptions and background of the concepts discussed throughout, 
including alliances, R&D productivity and M&As. Chapter 3 discusses the 
methodology used to explain the research questions, the sources of the data used, 
and what kind of empirical analysis will be performed. Chapter 4 presents and 
discusses the empirical findings. Chapter 5 introduces a discussion of the results. 




2. Literature review 
2.1 Alliances 
Alliances are relationships between two or more firms that involve the 
exchange, sharing or co-development of resources and capabilities (Gulati, 1995) 
as well as the pooling of resources and skills in order to achieve mutually 
common goals (Varadarajan and Cunningham, 1995). Alliances introduce several 
advantages for organisations that engage in them: they stimulate the rate of entry 
of firms into new markets (Elmuti and Kathawala, 2001; Haase and Franco, 2015), 
allow firms to learn from each other (Hamel et al., 1989; Anand and Khanna, 2000; 
Kale et al., 2000), enable the access to complementary assets (Arora and 
Gambardella, 1990; Rothaermel, 2001), help to overcome market failures 
(Williamson, 1989), help to build new competences (Hennart, 1991; Varadarajan 
and Cunningham, 1995), facilitate entry into new markets and enhance 
knowledge about new technologies (Kogut, 1991; Mowery et al., 1996; García-
Canal et al., 2002), allow sharing of risks, as well as costs that may originate from 
R&D or manufacturing processes (Ohmae, 1989; Varadarajan and Cunningham, 
1995; Lu and Beamish, 2001), foster the development of new products 
(Rothaermel and Deeds, 2004) and improve market power (Porter and Fuller, 
1986; Kogut, 1991).  
Additionally, strategic alliances can take on several configurations depending 
on which part of the value chain they influence and to what extent equity plays 
a role. Whereas a joint venture will involve some equity share between two 
companies (say, a 50-50 share), a joint R&D contractual agreement does not have 
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to include equity. Instead, it may simply feature a written contract which is 
agreed by both parties (Kale and Singh, 2009). Nevertheless, this study shall be 
focussing on R&D alliances between two or more firms who jointly collaborate 
to research and/or produce a new drug. An example of an R&D alliance between 
two pharmaceutical firms was that of AstraZeneca with Cambridge Antibody 
Technology to collaborate on monoclonal antibodies (Ernst & Young, as cited in 
Jones and Clifford, 2005, p808). 
However, it is crucial to mention that alliances also possess some 
disadvantages, especially if they are not managed correctly, which may lead to 
the destruction of core capabilities (Hamel, 1991). In his paper, Elmuti (2001) 
states that many researchers have come to the conclusion that the rate of success 
of alliances is quite low and many do not actually succeed. Bamford et al. (2004) 
and Kalmbach and Roussel (1999) go further and report that between 30% and 
70% of alliances fail, whilst Das (2000) mentions that around half of alliances 
formed are actually stable or achieve satisfactory performance. Therefore, 
establishing collaboration deals is something that must be carefully planned and 
researched to avoid common mistakes such as the ones mentioned above. 
Moreover, the characteristics that make up the pharmaceutical industry intensify 
the probability that alliances could be less successful. The pharmaceutical sector 
is one of the sectors with the highest intensity of R&D (Ornaghi, 2009), it is 
surrounded by high degrees of uncertainty and riskiness (DiMasi et al., 1991; 
Rothaermel and Boeker, 2008) and is a technology intensive industry (Orsenigo 
et al., 2001). These set of conditions assist in the probability that alliances may be 
more prone to failure in relation to ones that are established in less 
technologically intensive sectors. 
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2.2 Advantage of collaborating before M&A 
Market failure due to information asymmetry is frequent and a source of many 
problems, mainly because the acquiring firm tends to possess little or inaccurate 
information about its potential target (Porrini, 2004; Higgins and Rodriguez, 
2006; Zaheer et al., 2010); leading to situations of adverse selection where targets 
can turn out to be “lemons” (Akerlof, 1970). Higgins and Rodriguez (2006) find 
that in the situations where the target firm withholds information from the 
acquiring firm about the value of their assets, the acquirer “tends to succumb to 
the winner’s curse and overpay for the target” (Higgins and Rodriguez, 2006, p. 
356). Furthermore, regular due diligence might not solve this issue because there 
is always a possibility that the target firm may distort the true valuation of its 
assets, whether intentionally or not. Coff (1999, as cited by Zaheer et al., 2010) 
identified three types of information asymmetry that may arise when valuing 
assets of a target firm, these include: quality of assets; transferability of assets, 
and prospects for synergy. 
For these reasons, when deciding on acquiring a firm, besides performing the 
regular corporate due diligence procedures, firms should engage in other 
activities which allow them to collect crucial information about the target firm. 
The proposal in this report is that alliances should be considered as a way of 
acquiring information that would otherwise be non-accessible to obtain better 
insight into the true value of the company.  
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2.3 Mergers and acquisitions in pharmaceutical industry 
2.3.1 Brief history 
The pharmaceutical industry has been characterized by various merger waves 
along the years, contributing to an increased concentration for the past 40 years. 
In his book focussing of mergers and acquisitions in the pharmaceutical industry, 
Rajesh Kumar (2012) found that in 1985 the largest ten pharmaceutical firms 
accounted for 20% of world sales and in 2002 this value increased to 48%. It 
would come as no surprise if today this value were to have increased even more. 
In addition, between 1985 and 2007, numerous M&As led to a consolidation of 
51 companies becoming only 10. 
The two largest M&As in the history of the pharmaceutical industry were 
consummated during the second merger wave, which began in the 1990s and 
went up until the 2000s, more specifically, both occurred in 2000. The first one 
was Pfizer’s acquisition of Warner-Lambert for around US$164 billion and the 
second was Glaxo Wellcome’s merger with SmithKline Beecham for around 
US$108 billion (values adjusted for inflation). To understand how prevalent 
M&A’s are in the pharma industry, in 2013, 2014 and 2015, three out of the ten 
major deals during each of these years occurred in this sector (Bloomberg, 2018). 
2.3.2 Determinants of Mergers and Acquisitions 
The main motives behind M&A’s in the pharmaceutical industry can usually 
be divided into five main categories, but I shall focus on the three most relevant 
ones for this study. These include, strategic response to environmental change, 
economies of scale and scope, and access to new technologies. Firstly, the idea 
that industry-wide shocks can lead to the creation of merger waves was firstly 
introduced by Gort (1969), and these help to understand how merger waves 
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could happen in other industries, such as banking and telecommunications 
(Grabowski and Kyle, 2012). During the 1980s, the pharmaceutical industry 
suffered an environmental transformation with R&D productivity falling as well 
as price competition becoming more intense due an increase in generic drugs, 
increased government pressure and a major crisis of patent expiration (Munos, 
2009).  With this in mind, firms had to reinvent their strategies to improve R&D 
productivity, limit buyer power and try to challenge generic drug producers. 
Thus, mergers and acquisitions turned into an attractive strategy that firms with 
large amounts of accumulated cash could pursue to face these challenges, which 
ultimately led to the first wave of M&A’s in the pharma industry. Mergers and 
acquisitions are an efficient way to cut costs because they allow for consolidation 
of operations, departments and administrative functions such as HR, legal, 
marketing and R&D staff. An example of this can be seen in the merger between 
Ciba and Sandoz that led to the creation of Novartis. This merger allowed the 
merged entity cost savings of around CHF1.5 billion in its first year of existence 
(Rajesh Kumar, 2012) due to the cost reduction in their highly complex supply 
chain that was the backbone of their manufacturing business. However, in an 
analysis published by Munos (2009) focussing on the effect of M&As on NME 
(new molecular entity) output, it was found that M&As are an effective way of 
boosting NME output for small firms but the same is not true for large 
companies. More specifically, there is a 95% probability that an M&A will 
increase NME output for small firms, whereas for large firms it is 95% likely that 
an M&A will not affect NME output.  
Economies of scale and scope can be categorized as proactive motives for 
M&As, and these may include achieving economies of scale in research and 
development processes to increase productivity. Citing a series of studies by 
Henderson and Cockburn, Grabowski and Kyle (2012) describe that when 
examining the effect of scale and scope on productivity, the authors find that 
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large firms engaging in a broader scope of R&D activities produce a higher drug 
output than focused firms; showing that there is a positive correlation between 
economies of scope and productivity. However, there are some limitations 
towards this study. Even though the authors use very detailed data, the sample 
is composed of only 10 firms, which is troublesome when attempting to 
generalize the results. The famous merger between Pfizer and Warner-Lambert, 
Inc. allowed Pfizer to broaden its product lines with products including Listerine 
mouthwash and Wilkinson Sword shaving products (Rajesh Kumar, 2012), and its 
R&D focus into new areas such as oncology and ophthalmology. In addition, 
Pfizer managed to obtain full ownership of Lipitor (a blockbuster cholesterol 
drug) that went on to become the best-selling drug in the world with sales 
exceeding US$5 billion. However, Grabowski and Kyle (2012) argue that a point 
has been reached where the effect of diminishing returns may start to be noticed 
because both the benefits from economies of scale and scope become cancelled 
out. The increased bureaucracy and the various challenges arising from 
motivating large teams of individuals to foster their creativity may not be worth 
the increased breadth in R&D research. 
Thirdly, pharmaceutical companies may turn to mergers and acquisitions to 
gain access to the source of new products in high-growth therapeutic areas. The 
process of producing and commercializing drugs consists mainly of three stages: 
drug discovery, development and commercialization. The drug discovery phase 
is composed of two sub-phases: basic research and preclinical research and 
development, which on average take around 6 years (DiMasi et al., 2003; Lin, 
2009). Thus, to accelerate entry into new therapeutic areas and to avoid drug 
development processes that may be unsuccessful, large pharmaceutical 
companies (Big Pharma) tend to establish alliances and/or merge with smaller 
research-based firms to access their new technologies. An example of this 
situation occurred when Hoffman-LaRoche acquired part of Genentech in 1990 
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to gain access to their products which Hoffman-LaRoche believed were 
innovative and had great potential (Rajesh Kumar, 2012). Finally, companies may 
wish to engage in M&As as a result of ageing product pipelines and patent 
expiration issues, but this shall be explored further below. 
Moreover, mergers tend to have the ultimate goal of cost-cutting and slimming 
drug pipeline portfolios and when a merger actually goes through, the R&D 
portfolios of both firms are examined in order to “eliminate those they see as 
‘duplicative’” (Comanor and Scherer, 2013, p. 110). Having said this, if firms 
decide to collaborate in cooperative agreements before immediately engaging in 
a merger or acquisition, the likelihood of pursuing new drugs will be lower 
because larger firms tend to be more risk averse. This may be due to regulators 
having become more risk averse over time (DiMasi et al., 2016).  
2.4 Pipelines, patents, NME costs 
Various studies have been carried out regarding research and development 
costs of new drugs and biologics in the pharmaceutical industry. These studies 
look at the value of the resources used to discover and develop new compounds 
by focussing on the overall probability of clinical success of the different phases 
of the NME creation process. One possible explanation for the formation of 
alliances between firms in the pharmaceutical industry has to do with the ever-
increasing R&D cost of developing new molecules. When observing a period 
between 1983-1994, DiMasi et al. (2003) obtained an out-of-pocket R&D cost 
estimate of US$1.04 billion (adjusted to 2013 dollars). In the latest report, DiMasi 
and Grabowski (2016) estimated the cost to be of around US$2.5 billion. This large 
increase in R&D costs (166% increase) can be explained by the different time 
periods studied by each paper. Whereas the first study involved NME approvals 
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in the 1990s, the latest study focussed on NME approvals in 2000s and 2010s. 
Subsequently, not many companies have enough resources to develop such 
expensive drugs by themselves, nor do they have the required marketing skills 
to promote and introduce these newly developed drugs into the everyday 
medical use (Comanor and Scherer, 2013). Therefore, firms tend to look for 
collaboration opportunities with other firms to finance and operate testing 
procedures prior to approval by regulatory authorities. These collaboration 
opportunities are usually in the form of licensing agreements, joint ventures or 
R&D alliances with smaller firms, usually small “biotech” companies or 
universities with their own research centres. If the partnership is seen as being 
successful, the larger pharmaceutical firm tends to acquire the smaller company. 
Consistent with literature, this increasing cost of R&D is reflected by a change in 
the industry environment and its trends, due to growing alliances between firms, 
enhanced power of buyers, major hubs shifting to hotspots, increased regulation, 
looming patent cliffs, as well as tailored pipelines (Munos, 2009; Gautam and 
Pan, 2016). 
Patent expiration plays a crucial role in the decision of whether or not a 
company should engage in an M&A; when a patent expires, revenues tend to 
decrease drastically (Rajesh Kumar, 2012). As an example, Prozac, an anti-
depressant drug discovered by Eli Lilly and Co., suffered a decrease in sales of 
around 22% the year after it came off patent and generics were introduced in the 
market. There are two main types of patent protections for pharmaceutical firms. 
The first type is the normal, generic patent which is granted by the United States 
Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO) (Higgins and Rodriguez, 2006) and the 
second type of protection is granted by the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) 
and is mostly known as exclusivity. However, the creation of the Hatch-Waxman 
Act of 1984 allowed generic drug manufacturers to obtain marketing approval 
by the FDA as long as they could prove that their drug had bioequivalence to 
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original product. Following the passage of this Act, competition from generic 
manufacturers thrived in such a way that, in 1984, 19% of US prescriptions were 
in the form of generic drugs and in 2013 these accounted for 86% of the market 
(Grabowski et al., 2015). It was also expected that due to losses in market 
exclusivity, around US$140 billion would be lost in 2013 (Rajesh Kumar, 2012). 
Looking back at the trend of diminishing returns that was mentioned earlier, 
the various merger waves that occurred throughout the last 30 years contributed 
to firms becoming bloated with manufacturing facilities, R&D laboratories and 
bureaucratic complexities spread around various places in the world. In addition, 
whenever a merger or acquisition involved a company in a foreign country, an 
added layer of complexity regarding cultural integration had to be considered. 
Consequently, a trend that big pharmaceutical companies began to adopt was 
that of becoming lean and focussed by “divesting non-core assets and focussing 
on areas of strength” (Gautam and Pan, 2016, p. 380). For example, in an effort to 
become more streamlined and focussed, Abbott decided to split into two separate 
companies in 2013: AbbVie became responsible for the innovative pharma 
business, whilst Abbott focussed on diversified healthcare products. Similarly, 
an unintended, or at least unforeseen consequence of the race towards economies 
of scale and scope was that multiple research hubs became dispersed across the 
world. For example, AstraZeneca had over ten R&D laboratories in countries 
such as the USA, UK, Sweden and Canada. Thus, since 2005, most Big Pharma 
organisations shifted their strategies by consolidating their R&D sites within 
innovation clusters in San Francisco, London and Shanghai. The main 
advantages of this strategy are the increase in access to external innovation 
through alliances, easier collaboration with universities and scientists, as well as 
providing a more collaborative environment.    
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2.5 Declining R&D productivity 
Moore’s Law – considered by many as the golden rule in the electronics 
industry – states that the number of transistors that can be placed onto an 
integrated circuit should double every two years. Over the years, this concept has 
been applied generally in the technology industry and has usually proved 
accurate due to the innovation and continuous improvement of this sector. 
Scannell et al. (2012) came up with a term to describe the opposite effect to that 
of Moore’s Law. Eroom’s Law is the name chosen to characterize the following 
trend. In their article, they found that the number of new FDA-approved drugs 
has “halved every 9 years, since 1950”, per billion USD of R&D spending. 
 
Figure 1 - Approval timeline for new molecular entities (NMEs) 
Since 1950, around 1500 NME’s have been approved by the FDA, which 
amounts to an average of 23 new drug approvals per year. As seen in Figure 1, 





































































































































































large spike in 1996 due to the approval of the Prescription Drug User Fee Act 
(PDUFA). This law was created in 1992 to authorize the FDA to “collect fees from 
companies that produce certain human drug and biological products” (FDA, 
2018, (4)). In addition, Munos (2009) postulates that the spike in 1996 was in part 
a consequence of this Act since user fees helped to speed up drug approval 
processes. From 1996 until today, the rate of drug approval has returned to its 
historical average. 
The productivity crisis, namely, the R&D productivity crisis in the 
pharmaceutical industry has been a popular topic in research papers and opinion 
articles (Danzon et al., 2007; Munos, 2009; Pammolli et al., 2011; Scannell et al., 
2012; Schuhmacher et al., 2016; Ringel and Choy, 2017). Even though the cost of 
developing NMEs as well as R&D expenditures have been consistently 
increasing, the rate of NME approval has stayed mostly constant. Thus, if the 
annual drug output of pharmaceutical firms has been constant for the better part 
of the last 50 years, and assuming they have been actively trying to improve these 
levels of performance, it is quite unlikely that there will be radical change 
(Munos, 2009). Consequently, firms have been resorting to merging with and 
acquiring smaller firms in hope that they can increase NME output. 
When measuring R&D productivity, NMEs are usually one of the elements 
used because they are a good representation of the firms’ outputs. R&D 
productivity is usually measured as a ratio of inputs to outputs, however, 
quantifying what and how many inputs can produce a certain amount of outputs 
is very dubious, especially in the pharmaceutical industry (Pammolli et al., 2011). 
Moreover, there is a high degree of uncertainty between the expenditure that is 
undertaken today to ensure future returns (Hall and Mairesse, 2009). For 
example, if the production of a drug is a product of an alliance between five firms 
and two universities, coming up with a number that can quantify the inputs 
invested may turn out to be a daunting task. 
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2.6 Similar literature 
When studying strategic alliances between US and Japanese firms, Hurry 
(1993) recognizes that the steps taken by firms in the integration process from 
cooperation to acquisition entails some advantages since it allows time for firms 
to learn about each other. The author finds a positive link for acquisitions 
between firms in the same therapeutic category in that they generate higher 
average abnormal returns (5.08%) when compared to acquisitions within 
different therapeutic areas (3.24%). 
A study by Danzon et al. (2005) shows that smaller firms have actually helped 
in the development of new drugs by licensing these drugs to larger pharma 
companies. These large firms then carry the drugs through the various 
procedures until they are ultimately approved by the regulatory authorities. In 
addition, they find that “drugs developed in alliances are more likely to succeed 
in clinical trials” (2005, p. 319) and that large firms experience higher rates of 
success for licenced compounds when compared to compounds that are 
developed in-house. However, their study is faced with a key limitation, in that 
data is insufficient to analyse alliance formation. 
Higgins and Rodriguez (2006) find that if the acquiring firm can have access 
to more information during the pre-acquisition period, this will lead to greater 
probability of success of the R&D alliance. There is vast literature supporting the 
idea that bidding firms tend to overpay for their target when engaging in an 
acquisition and that its shareholders gain little value (Dodd, 1980; Asquith, 1983; 
Andrade et al., 2001). This becomes more evident for firms that possess many 
intangible assets, as they can be tough to value. Thus, Higgins and Rodriguez 
(2006) posit that forming pre-acquisition alliances may help in reducing this 
information asymmetry since firms will have more time to gather information 
before eventually merging or acquiring. In fact, for the cases in which the 
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acquiring company had engaged in an alliance before the acquisition, average 
abnormal returns amounted to 4.30%, whereas in the cases where an acquisition 
took place without previous cooperation between the two firms, the returns were 
of 3.36%. A possible reason for this effect has to do with the importance of the 
pre-acquisition phase in the overall M&A process. This phase is crucial due to 
the information that can be learnt and shared between the two companies and its 
staff, namely, information from relevant departments such as, human resources, 
financial, IT, tax and legal. In addition, strategic alliances may be used as a tool 
to evaluate the environment where the firms are conducting business in 
(Hagedoorn et al., 1999). The authors of this study found little evidence to 
support their hypothesis about strategic technology alliances acting as an 
originator to the formation of M&As; in fact, only 2.60% of the strategic 
technology alliances studied could be linked to a merger or acquisition.  
Arora et al. (2007) use a sample of around 3000 drug-related R&D projects in 
the US between the years of 1980 and 1994 to “compare the innovation 
performance of pharmaceutical and biotech companies” and look at the role that 
licencing and alliances play in these projects. Arora et al. (2007) and Danzon et 
al. (2005) have complementary views regarding alliances as both studies find 
positive effects associated with alliances. 
Siebert et al. (2017) found that the number of R&D projects as well as the 
number of drugs that are launched onto the product market increase if R&D 
partnerships are established in the beginning of the drug development process, 
and they attribute this to the effect of economies of scale. Conversely, in the cases 
where these collaboration partnerships are established in later drug development 
stages, the number of drugs that are launched on the market is significantly 
reduced. These results show that when firms collaborate in advance and without 
time constraints, they are able to rethink their drug pipeline portfolio to avoid 
overlap of similar R&D efforts and thus avoid destroying future sales. 
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A similar study to this one is performed by Meschi, Metais and Shimizu (2017) 
on the acquisition by French firms in the US, where the duration of the pre-
acquisition alliance is investigated as to whether having a beneficial ou harmful 
impact on the performance of an ensuing acquisiton. In addition, the authors 
study how alliance duration affects different types of alliances, including joint 
ventures, minority investments and non-equity collaborations. The argument put 
forth by these authors is that decisions that are taken to merge or acquire a firm 
during an early-stage of an alliance are biased by “honeymoon effects” and 
possible red flags are often overlooked. Their findings show that when joint 
ventures and minority investments have a duration between seven and eight 
years, they demonstrate a high probability of acquisition failure. Another 
interesting finding is that this probability of acquisition failure increases with 




3. Data and Methodology 
3.1 Data 
3.1.1 Data processing 
To obtain the necessary information for this investigation, data about both 
mergers and acquisitions and alliance activity between firms in the 
pharmaceutical sector was required. However, most databases (the ones that 
were accessible) either include information about M&As or about R&D alliances; 
no database was able to provide information about both. Therefore, a merger of 
the two databases would be needed to come up with a complete database that 
enables comparison and cross-referencing between them to run empirical testing 
and obtain results. 
This study relies solely on secondary data which was obtained from two 
different databases. To obtain the M&A deals data, Thomson Reuters database 
was used via the Deal Screener productivity tool. This tool allows for the 
customization of search queries to select the most relevant data needed where 
some filters/criteria may be selected. Firstly, only deals under the completed 
category were selected, indicating the deals for which the transaction has closed. 
Secondly, the deal forms selected were the following: acquisition, merger, and 
acquisition of majority interest. This last category was chosen because it 
represents the situations in which the acquirer held less than 50% of the target 
company’s stock before the deal and is seeking to acquire 50% or more (but less 
than 100%). No restrictions were placed on deal value since the sample should 
capture all deals regardless of size. In addition, to ensure that only firms 
 32 
operating in the pharmaceutical sector were represented in the data, companies 
were selected based on their Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) codes. 
Following Danzon et al. (2007) and Higgins & Rodriguez (2006) search method, 
this range of SIC codes cover the pharmaceutical industry: 2833-2836. Thus, the 
transactions between companies with the aforementioned SIC codes were 
selected for the M&A database. Moreover, to maximise the probability of finding 
financial company information online, deals were selected if the target and 
acquiring firm were both public. Finally, the sample was restricted to 
transactions that occurred between 01/01/1981 and 01/07/2018 to match with the 
R&D database which shall be explained below. In all, the M&A sample was left 
with a universe of 635 deals. 
Regarding the R&D alliance information, OVID’s IMS Health (R&D Focus) 
database was used to obtain all data. This database contains (n = 7064) 
observations, each representing a specific molecule for which an R&D 
collaboration alliance occurred. Anatomical Therapeutic Chemical (ATC) codes 
are used to indicate which therapeutic area(s) each molecule targets. Using ATC 
codes as a classification method proves useful because besides being the standard 
classification method, it is tightly controlled by the World Health Organization 
(WHO), and it is usually how competition authorities define the market. In 
addition, for each observation there is an indication of the beginning and end 
dates of the R&D alliances, their duration, and which firms participated in the 
collaboration. The number of collaborating firms ranges from 2 to 23. In this 
database, information on R&D processes is available from 01/01/1981 up until 
01/01/2011. However, the synergies gained throughout the alliance process may 
not lead to a merger or an acquisition by one of the collaborating firms 
immediately after the process is terminated, therefore all M&As occurring post-
2011 were also selected to take part in the database. 
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Once the two databases were ready, they had to be merged to see whether any 
firms that have had a history of collaboration engaged in a subsequent merger or 
acquisition. To carry out this process, firms from the alliance database had to be 
divided into pairs to ‘match’ with the pairs of firms in the M&A database during 
the merger procedure. For example, if companies A, B, C, D collaborated to 
produce drug X, the possible collaboration pairs would have to be: AB, AC, AD, 
BC, BD, CD. This ‘pairing’ process was carried out using VBA in Microsoft Excel 
until all R&D processes were represented by pairs of companies. Unfortunately, 
firm names in each database were not the same - some firm names were 
abbreviated -, most likely because they originated from different sources, which 
made the merging process slightly more complex. Nevertheless, the Fuzzy 
Lookup Tool 1 , a Microsoft Excel add-in, was used to find similar matches 
between firm names of both databases and produce an output table with a 
similarity probability index. Even though this tool did not provide a perfect 
merger between names, it definitely sped up the process and eliminated the need 
to go through each name individually hoping to find a match. Thus, only an 
overview check was required to see whether the matches were in fact correct. 
Unfortunately, a margin of human error throughout this process is inevitable 
since it is an individual and manual procedure. 
  
                                                 
1 https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/download/details.aspx?id=15011 (Fuzzy Lookup Excel Add-in; Accessed on 
25/07/2018) 
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3.1.1 Preliminary data 
Variable Total 
Merger = 1, 
Alliance = 1 
Merger = 1, 
Alliance = 0 
Merger = 0, 
Alliance = 1 
Number of pairs 13789 51 547 13191 
Average alliance 
duration (years) 
5,89 5,84 N/A 5,89 
Average number of 
drugs collaborated 
2,27 21,10 N/A 2,19 
Average M&A deal 
value (millions) 
$2 225,96 $3 134,63 $2 141,24 N/A 
Average number of 
years between alliance 
and M&A 
2,10 2,10 N/A N/A 
Table 1 - Summary statistics 
The data in Table 1 shows some early preliminary statistics gathered from the 
merged database prior to performing any regressions. The first impression that 
can be noticed from this table is that the number of observations for the pairs of 
firms that engaged in an alliance followed by a merger is quite small (51 
observations). However, a large difference is found when looking at the average 
number of drugs that firms collaborated on. In a regular alliance, more 
specifically in the situations where an alliance does not lead to a future merger 
between firms, the number of drugs that firms collaborate on is on average 2. 
Conversely, in alliances that led to a future merger, the number of drugs 
collaborated increases to 21! This is an extremely interesting result because it may 
suggest that a ‘stronger’ alliance, where more collaboration ensues and where 
firms get to work more with each other may lead to a future merger or acquisition 
by one of the parts. In addition, the deal value of an M&A is on average US$1 
million higher for firms that have engaged in an alliance with each other before 
the merger. Whilst this tendency may be explained by the idea that alliances can 
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help reduce information asymmetry that is usually present in M&A processes, 
supporting Higgins and Rodriguez’s (2006) theory, without further control 
variables this statement becomes quite inconclusive. 
  
A clear trend can be seen throughout the years regarding the value of M&A 
deals when looking at Figure 2. Even though M&A activity was already prevalent 
during the 1980s and 1990s, it was not until 1998 that deal values exponentially 
increased to amounts that were higher than ever before. To better illustrate this 
point, until 1997 an M&A transaction had on average a value of US$6 billion; 
whereas from 1998 until 2017 (latest data), this value increased to around US$62 
billion. This massive increase in deal value can be attributed to large 
pharmaceutical firms experiencing expiring patents which allows for an influx of 
competition. In turn, these firms may decide to overhaul their research and 
development pipelines by acquiring potential targets. Thus, it comes as no 
surprise that 2018 has been the year in which the pharmaceutical sector has 
experienced its strongest start in M&A in more than a decade (The Financial 














































































































































































Figure 2 - Volume of M&A deals (1981-2017) 
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pharmaceutical industry can easily be spotted, and coincidentally, each wave is 
characterized by a higher average deal value than the previous one. The first 
wave can be seen around 1999, where deal values surpassed US$100 billion for 
the first time and was mainly amplified by Pfizer’s acquisition of Warner-
Lambert Co. by US$90 billion along with the merger of Glaxo Wellcome and 
SmithKline Beecham for US$76 billion. Subsequently, the second wave took place 
around 2009 with M&A deal volumes reaching US$120 billion, with deals such 
as Pfizer’s acquisition of Wyeth for US$68 billion. Finally, the third merger wave 
occurred around 2014 with deal volumes surpassing US$150 billion, with 
Actavis’ acquisition of Allergan being the most expensive one during this wave 
with a value of US$68 billion.  
 
The information present in Figure 3 is particularly useful since it provides a 
comparison between the value of the M&A deals that occurred after two firms 






































































































































































































































M&A deal volume in pharmaceutical sector (1981-2017)
M&A with previous alliance M&A with no previous alliance
Figure 3 - M&A deal volume with and without previous alliance (1981-2017) 
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of collaboration with each other. However, it also allows to see if these two types 
of M&As occur during identical time periods. If they do, then we can say that 
mergers are simply linked to the merger waves previously explained; but if not, 
then it is possible that the merger or acquisition is connected to the alliance and 
not solely to the merger wave. From the information present in Figure 3 there 
seems to be a somewhat negative correlation between deal values of M&As with 
and without previous alliances throughout the years. Namely, between 2007 to 
2010 this pattern is evident because 2008 and 2010 are the years with the highest 
deal values of M&As with a previous alliance and, simultaneously, deal values 
for M&A with no previous alliance are found to be remarkably low. The opposite 
however, can be seen in 2009, with a high deal value for M&As with no previous 
alliance and very low deal values for M&As with previous collaboration. 
Consequently, a quick examination of this trend supports the idea that these 
M&As are increasingly linked to the previous alliance established between the 































































































































































































Start of alliance End of alliance M&A volume
Figure 4 - Alliances vs M&A activity (1981-2014) 
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Figure 4 graphs a comparison between number of alliances established, 
number of alliances terminated and M&A activity per year between 1981 and 
2014.  Even though alliance data is only available until 2011, M&A data until 2014 
was included since the decision to acquire or merge with another firm may not 
be done immediately after the alliance is ended. The main patterns that can be 
perceived in Figure 4 somewhat corroborate the idea that alliances act as a 
precursor for a future merger or acquisition. Firstly, when looking at the data 
from 2003 it is clear that a large number (~900) of alliances were ended that year, 
and at the same time M&A activity intensified. A similar trend happens between 
2007-2009, where a record number of alliances are ended during those years and 
M&A activity is also quite prevalent. However, according to the data in Erro! A 
origem da referência não foi encontrada., the average time period between the 
end of an alliance and a future M&A is of around 2 years. By taking this into 
consideration and looking at Figure 4 once again, the large peak in M&A activity 
in 2013 may be a (somewhat delayed) result of the large number of alliances that 
ended during the previous years. Moreover, around 1998 (the first big merger 
wave of the pharmaceutical industry) M&A activity was becoming quite intense, 
which, following the same line of thought as above may indicate that this could 
have been the outcome of all collaborative alliances that were ended throughout 




3.2.1 Dependent variable 
Research and development productivity 
The dependent variable for this study must be one which measures the 
performance of a company but also captures the particularities of operating in 
the pharmaceutical sector. Measuring R&D productivity is seen by many 
researchers as a tricky matter to quantify (Pappas and Remer, 1985; Hannon et 
al., 2015) because it is usually calculated using a ratio of inputs to outputs. 
Looking at the pharma industry, inputs can easily be measured by seeing how 
much each company spends in R&D each year, however, the outputs are usually 
intangible and tough to quantify as a number. For this reason, a simplistic 
approach towards a productivity ratio based on R&D was selected. This ratio is 
calculated by dividing the net sales of the acquirer in the acquisition year and the 
R&D expenditure of the acquirer four years before the acquisition takes place. 
Since these values represent a function of the historical contribution of 
pharmaceutical companies towards R&D, the ratio was calculated with a time 
lag of four years (Schulze et al., 2014). A time period of four years was selected 
because most recent studies have pointed out that overall development time for 
a new drug (Phase I-III) to be on average eight years (Mc Namara and Baden-
Fuller, 2007; Mestre-Ferrandiz et al., 2012; Schulze et al., 2014; PHRMA, 2015). In 
addition, the future benefits that may arise from current R&D investments are 
subject to time lags and therefore become hard to accurately measure. Having 
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said this, an alternative measure of R&D productivity is also used to understand 
to what extent the end results are influenced by the way this variable is 













𝑹𝑫𝑷𝒓𝒐𝒅𝒕,𝒊 represents R&D productivity in year t for firm i 
𝑺𝒕,𝒊 represents net sales in year t for firm i 
𝑹𝑫𝒆𝒙𝒑𝒕−𝟒,𝒊 represents R&D expenditure in year t-4 for firm i 
𝑹𝒕,𝒊 represents returns to shareholders in year t for firm i 
3.2.2 Independent variable 
Previous alliance 
The chosen independent variable for this study is a dummy variable that takes 
the value of 1 if there has been a previous alliance between the acquirer and target 
firm. If more than one alliance has been established between the two firms, the 
dummy variable takes on the value of 1. To control for these cases where the 
number of alliances is higher than 1, some control variables have been selected 
and will be explained in greater detail below. Data regarding alliances comes 
solely from the R&D alliance database. 
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3.2.3 Control variables 
Change in debt to equity 
The change in debt to equity is measured as the difference between the debt 
to shareholder’s equity (D/E) ratio of the acquirer two years after the acquisition 
(t+2) and the D/E ratio of the acquirer one year before the acquisition takes place 
(t-1), and is divided by the D/E ratio one year before the acquisition (t-1). Porrini 
(2004) states that firms engaging in acquisitions (acquirers) tend to see their levels 
of debt increase after acquisitions take place. Since an increased amount of debt 
may influence how much a firm spends in R&D, I decided to control for this. 
 
𝐷 / 𝐸 =
𝐷𝑒𝑏𝑡 𝑡𝑜 𝑠ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒ℎ𝑜𝑙𝑑𝑒𝑟 𝑒𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑡+2
𝐴𝑄 − 𝐷𝑒𝑏𝑡 𝑡𝑜 𝑠ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒ℎ𝑜𝑙𝑑𝑒𝑟 𝑒𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑡−1
𝐴𝑄
𝐷𝑒𝑏𝑡 𝑡𝑜 𝑠ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒ℎ𝑜𝑙𝑑𝑒𝑟 𝑒𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑡−1
𝐴𝑄  (1.3) 
ROA 
This variable was selected to capture the change in ROA of the acquiring and 
target firm one year prior to the acquisition and two years after it occurred. It is 
measured as the difference between the ROA of the acquirer two years after the 
acquisition (t+2) and the weighted ROA of the acquirer and target one year before 
the acquisition takes place (t-1), divided by the weighted ROA of the acquirer 
and target one year prior to acquisition (t-1). Several researchers have used ROA 
as a measure of M&A performance (Meeks and Meeks, 1981; Harrison et al., 1991; 
Hitt et al., 1998; Papadakis and Thanos, 2010). Meeks and Meeks (1981) find that 
selecting return on assets as an indicator of pre and post-merger indicator is 
recommended because other indicators are more subject to potential biases. 










This is a variable that takes the value of 1 if the target firm is located in a 
different geographic region (i.e. country) than the acquiring firm and 0 if both 
companies operate within the same country.  
Alliance duration 
This variable (measured in years) measures the duration of the alliance 
established between two companies. It is calculated from the formation date until 
its date of termination, and for the companies that engaged in more than one 
alliance, an average duration of the alliances is computed. 
Number of drugs collaborated 
Similar to the previous variable, this variable measures the number of drugs 
that pairs of firms have collaborated on. 
 
Finally, in a paper by Hou, Xue and Zhang (2015), the authors find that using 
a q-factor model which includes “a market factor, a size factor, an investment 
factor, and a profitability factor” is superior in capturing significant anomalies 
than using the Fama-French model. Thus, following (Lee, 2016), the following 
variables which represent important financial factors were selected to control for 
M&A activity: market capitalization, net income and return on invested capital.  
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3.2.4 Regressions 
Having mentioned the independent, dependent and control variables that 
shall be used, the chosen regressions will be divided into two groups with four 
regressions each, yielding a total of eight regressions. The first group will feature 
the dummy variable “Previous alliance” as independent variable, whereas the 
second group will lose this variable in exchange for “Alliance duration” and 
“Number of drugs collaborated”. The reasoning behind this decision shall be 
explained below. 
Equations 1.5 and 1.6 aim to show the effect of a previous alliance between 
two firms on the R&D productivity of the merged firm. Whereas equation 1.5 




𝑺 = 𝜷𝟎 + 𝜷𝟏𝑨𝑳𝑳𝒕,𝒊 + 𝜷𝟐𝑫𝑬𝒕,𝒊 + 𝜷𝟑𝑹𝑶𝑨𝒕,𝒊 + 𝜷𝟒𝑪𝑩𝒊 + 𝜷𝟓𝑵𝑰𝒕,𝒊
+ 𝜷𝟔𝑴𝑪𝒕,𝒊 + 𝜷𝟕𝑹𝑶𝑰𝑪𝒕,𝒊 + 𝜺𝒊,𝒕 
(1.5) 
𝑹𝑫𝑷𝒓𝒐𝒅𝒕,𝒊
𝑹 = 𝜷𝟎 + 𝜷𝟏𝑨𝑳𝑳𝒕,𝒊 + 𝜷𝟐𝑫𝑬𝒕,𝒊 + 𝜷𝟑𝑹𝑶𝑨𝒕,𝒊 + 𝜷𝟒𝑪𝑩𝒊 + 𝜷𝟓𝑵𝑰𝒕,𝒊
+ 𝜷𝟔𝑴𝑪𝒕,𝒊 + 𝜷𝟕𝑹𝑶𝑰𝑪𝒕,𝒊 + 𝜺𝒊,𝒕 
(1.6) 
𝑨𝑳𝑳𝒕,𝒊 represents a dummy variable that takes the value 1 if there has been a 
previous alliance between the acquirer and target firm 
𝑫𝑬𝒕,𝒊 represents the change in debt to equity for firm i in year t 
𝑹𝑶𝑨𝒕,𝒊 represents the change in ROA for firm i in year t 
𝑪𝑩𝒕,𝒊 represents a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if the target firm is 
located in a different geographic region (i.e. country) than the acquiring firm 
𝑵𝑰𝒕,𝒊 represents the year end net income for firm i in year t 
𝑴𝑪𝒕,𝒊 represents the year end market capitalization for firm i in year t 
𝑹𝑶𝑰𝑪𝒕,𝒊 represents the return on invested capital for firm i in year t 
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Equations 1.7 and 1.8 are identical to the ones above but these include year-
fixed effects. Year-fixed effects were added as separate regressions to control for 
possible variations in the outcome that could happen over the years and that 
cannot be explained by any of the other explanatory variables. 
 
𝑹𝑫𝑷𝒓𝒐𝒅𝒕,𝒊
𝑺 = 𝜷𝟎 + 𝜷𝟏𝑨𝑳𝑳𝒕,𝒊 + 𝜷𝟐𝑫𝑬𝒕,𝒊 + 𝜷𝟑𝑹𝑶𝑨𝒕,𝒊 + 𝜷𝟒𝑪𝑩𝒊 + 𝜷𝟓𝑵𝑰𝒕,𝒊
+ 𝜷𝟔𝑴𝑪𝒕,𝒊 + 𝜷𝟕𝑹𝑶𝑰𝑪𝒕,𝒊 + 𝜷𝟖𝑭𝑬𝒕 + 𝜺𝒊,𝒕 
(1.7) 
𝑹𝑫𝑷𝒓𝒐𝒅𝒕,𝒊
𝑹 = 𝜷𝟎 + 𝜷𝟏𝑨𝑳𝑳𝒕,𝒊 + 𝜷𝟐𝑫𝑬𝒕,𝒊 + 𝜷𝟑𝑹𝑶𝑨𝒕,𝒊 + 𝜷𝟒𝑪𝑩𝒊 + 𝜷𝟓𝑵𝑰𝒕,𝒊
+ 𝜷𝟔𝑴𝑪𝒕,𝒊 + 𝜷𝟕𝑹𝑶𝑰𝑪𝒕,𝒊 + 𝜷𝟖𝑭𝑬𝒕 + 𝜺𝒊,𝒕 
(1.8) 
𝑭𝑬𝒕 represent the year fixed effects for year t 
 
The following four equations are part of the second group of regressions 
where the independent variable becomes “Alliance duration” (ALLYRS) and 
“Number of drugs collaborated” (DRUGS). Since these two variables reflect 
particular characteristics of alliances, the inclusion of these variables in the 
regression may make it possible to narrow down what are the main factors 
within an alliance that affect R&D productivity. More specifically, this will help 
understand if the effect (whether it be positive or negative) of a previous alliance 
on R&D productivity is related to the number of years that the alliance lasted for 
or to the number of individual drugs that firms collaborated on. Therefore, 




𝑺 = 𝜷𝟎 + 𝜷𝟏𝑨𝑳𝑳𝒀𝑹𝑺𝒊 + 𝜷𝟐𝑫𝑹𝑼𝑮𝑺𝒊 + 𝜷𝟑𝑫𝑬𝒕,𝒊 + 𝜷𝟒𝑹𝑶𝑨𝒕,𝒊
+ 𝜷𝟓𝑪𝑩𝒊 + 𝜷𝟔𝑵𝑰𝒕,𝒊 + 𝜷𝟕𝑴𝑪𝒕,𝒊 + 𝜷𝟖𝑹𝑶𝑰𝑪𝒕,𝒊 + 𝜺𝒊,𝒕 
(1.9) 
𝑹𝑫𝑷𝒓𝒐𝒅𝒕,𝒊
𝑹 = 𝜷𝟎 + 𝜷𝟏𝑨𝑳𝑳𝒀𝑹𝑺𝒊 + 𝜷𝟐𝑫𝑹𝑼𝑮𝑺𝒊 + 𝜷𝟑𝑫𝑬𝒕,𝒊 + 𝜷𝟒𝑹𝑶𝑨𝒕,𝒊
+ 𝜷𝟓𝑪𝑩𝒊 + 𝜷𝟔𝑵𝑰𝒕,𝒊 + 𝜷𝟕𝑴𝑪𝒕,𝒊 + 𝜷𝟖𝑹𝑶𝑰𝑪𝒕,𝒊 + 𝜺𝒊,𝒕 
(1.10) 
𝑨𝑳𝑳𝒀𝑹𝑺𝒊 represents the duration of the alliance between a pair of firms i 
𝑫𝑹𝑼𝑮𝑺𝒊 represents the number of drugs collaborated between pair of firms i 
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Finally, equations 1.11 and 1.12 are identical to the ones above but with the 
inclusion of year-fixed effects. 
 
𝑹𝑫𝑷𝒓𝒐𝒅𝒕,𝒊
𝑺 = 𝜷𝟎 + 𝜷𝟏𝑨𝑳𝑳𝒀𝑹𝑺𝒊 + 𝜷𝟐𝑫𝑹𝑼𝑮𝑺𝒊 + 𝜷𝟑𝑫𝑬𝒕,𝒊 + 𝜷𝟒𝑹𝑶𝑨𝒕,𝒊
+ 𝜷𝟓𝑪𝑩𝒊 + 𝜷𝟔𝑵𝑰𝒕,𝒊 + 𝜷𝟕𝑴𝑪𝒕,𝒊 + 𝜷𝟖𝑹𝑶𝑰𝑪𝒕,𝒊 + 𝜷𝟗𝑭𝑬𝒕 + 𝜺𝒊,𝒕 
(1.11) 
𝑹𝑫𝑷𝒓𝒐𝒅𝒕,𝒊
𝑹 = 𝜷𝟎 + 𝜷𝟏𝑨𝑳𝑳𝒀𝑹𝑺𝒊 + 𝜷𝟐𝑫𝑹𝑼𝑮𝑺𝒊 + 𝜷𝟑𝑫𝑬𝒕,𝒊 + 𝜷𝟒𝑹𝑶𝑨𝒕,𝒊
+ 𝜷𝟓𝑪𝑩𝒊 + 𝜷𝟔𝑵𝑰𝒕,𝒊 + 𝜷𝟕𝑴𝑪𝒕,𝒊 + 𝜷𝟖𝑹𝑶𝑰𝑪𝒕,𝒊 + 𝜷𝟗𝑭𝑬𝒕 + 𝜺𝒊,𝒕 
(1.12) 






R&D productivity (sales)  44.13 146.86 345 
R&D productivity 
(return to shareholders) 
18.14 48.25 345 
Debt to equity 51.49 625.38 345 
ROA 4.45 93.35 345 
Net income 6,288,918 38,300,000 345 
Market capitalization 132,000,000 639,000,000 345 
ROIC 1.54 35.63 345 
Cross border 0.39 0.49 345 
Previous alliance 0.13 0.33 345 




Overall, eight regressions were performed to investigate the effect of a 
previous alliance between two organisations on the future R&D productivity of 
the merged company. The results from first set of regressions (equations 1.5 – 1.8) 
can be seen in Table 3 and the results from the second group of regressions 
(equations 1.9 – 1.12) are presented in Table 4. The first set of equations is 
investigating the effect of the existence of a previous alliance on the future R&D 
productivity of the firm, whereas the final group of equations introduces some 
more specific alliance characteristics to try to isolate where the effects are coming 
from. Regarding year-fixed effects (dummies), the results in Tables 3 and 4 
include regressions both without year-fixed effects (equations 1.5 – 1.6; 1.9 – 1.10) 
and with year-fixed effects (1.7 – 1.8; 1.11 – 1.12). The inclusion of year dummies 
in the regressions was done to control for possible temporal effects that could 
happen over the years and that, at the same time, cannot be explained by any 
other variable. Even though they are included, year-fixed effects are not 
presented in the tables of results. Likewise, firm-fixed effects were initially 
included in the regressions, however, this led to the model becoming overfit and 
producing an R-squared value that was too high to be considered significant. In 
other words, too many terms were added in proportion to the number of 
observations available per firm, which led to the fixed effect ‘pulling’ towards 
itself all the explanation of the model instead of reflecting the data of the overall 
population. Therefore, firm-fixed effects were excluded from the regressions. 
Before going into more detail about the values in the various models that were 
regressed, it may be compelling to look at Figure 5 and 6 which graphically 
demonstrate the relationship between R&D productivity and the number of 
years spent in an alliance. Figure 5 shows this relationship using R&D 
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productivity calculated using sales whilst Figure 6 uses R&D based on 
shareholder returns. In general, there appears to be a very slightly positive 
relationship in both situations between R&D productivity and alliance duration. 
In both cases data is mostly concentrated in the left half of the graph, indicating 
that the majority of alliances has a duration of less than ten years. However, the 
data present in Figure 6 follows the linear fit trendline much more closely than 
in Figure 5, which indicates that R&D Productivity based on shareholder returns 
is more correlated with alliance duration. Also, Figure 6 shows evidence that the 
added benefit of engaging in a longer-term alliance (+10 years) is poorly reflected 
on increased R&D productivity. This tendency is even more clear in Figure 5 
where some alliances lasting 6 years lead to a higher R&D productivity than 20-
year-old alliances. Whilst this may be an indication that there are other (more 
relevant) factors that can explain this relationship, there is also a possibility that 
there is an optimum amount of time that an alliance should last for that can 
benefit firms in reducing information asymmetry (Meschi et al., 2017), such as 
valuing intangible assets (i.e. workforce knowledge and skills) backing up the 
literature by Higgins and Rodriguez (2006). 
Table 3 presents the regression results for each variable in the first four models 
presented (equations 1.5 – 1.8). In these four models, the dependent variable, 
previous alliance, presents a negative coefficient and is statistically significant (p 
< .01). Even though the coefficients are all negative, the two equations using R&D 
productivity based on sales (1.5 and 1.7) exhibit much higher values. 
Nevertheless, they are consistent with each other, thus, when all other variables 
are held constant, a previous alliance between two firms can have a negative 
impact on future R&D productivity. When looking at the control variables, only 
ROA and ROIC have positive coefficients through all four models, however, 
whereas ROA is statistically significant (p < .01) in the four models, for ROIC this 
is only the case in the models without year-fixed effects; when year-fixed effects 
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are introduced its statistical significance is reduced (p < .1). Regarding the 
remaining control variables, they are all either negative or negligible and 
statistically significant (p < .01, p < .05) when R&D productivity is calculated 
using sales. When shareholder returns are used, results become insignificant. 
This may be an indication that the control variables, which are mostly financial 
indicators, are more closely related to sales than to shareholder returns. Finally, 
R-square values increase when year-fixed effects are added to the models; model 
1.7 has an R-squared of 17.2%, model 1.8 has an R-squared of 10.9%. 
The regression results for the next four models (equations 1.9 – 1.12) can be 
seen in Table 4. These models are testing the effect of alliance duration and 
number of drugs collaborated on the R&D productivity of the firm. 
Consequently, in these equations the alliance variable must be dropped. 
Interestingly, the drugs variable is negative and insignificant in all models, 
whereas the alliance duration variable is also negative but significant in 1.9 and 
1.10 (p < .01) and 1.11 and 1.12 (p < .05). As in the first group of equations, when 
looking at the control variables, only ROA and ROIC variables display positive 
coefficients. In addition, ROA is once again statistically significant (p < .01) and 
ROIC’s statistical significance ranges from p < .01 to p < .1. Concerning the 
remaining control variables, most were found to be negative or negligible and, 
once again, statistically significant only when R&D productivity was measured 
using sales as an indicator. R-squared values increase when year-fixed effects are 




Figure 5 - Relationship between R&D Productivity (sales) and alliance duration 
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Observations 344 345 344 345 
R-squared 0.112 0.016 0.172 0.109 
Year-Fixed 
effects 
NO NO YES YES 
Standard errors are in parenthesis  
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
































































































Observations 344 345 344 345 
R-squared 0.109 0.012 0.169 0.105 
Year-Fixed 
effects 
NO NO YES YES 
Standard errors are in parenthesis  
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Table 4 - Regression results showing the effect of alliance duration and number of drugs 





The pharmaceutical industry is a unique sector driven highly by research and 
development, that allows for an investigation on the effect that engaging in an 
alliance prior to an acquisition has on R&D productivity. This sector is noticeably 
dependent on its research departments to improve pipeline diversity, allowing 
firms to remain competitive. However, even though investment in R&D has been 
dramatically increasing over the past decades, output rates have not been 
following the same trend, as discussed in Chapter 2. In turn, this has caused 
uncertainty and raised questions regarding the sustainability of the industry 
(Munos, 2009) as well as the effectiveness of the current R&D model (Pammolli 
et al., 2011; Schuhmacher et al., 2016). In response to these mounting issues, 
pharmaceutical firms have looked at options to fight against these struggles. Such 
options include increasing their R&D operations by engaging in research 
collaborations, acquiring and/or merging with other firms to broader their drug 
pipelines, and engaging in horizontal M&As to achieve economies of scale and 
scope. To further investigate and to try to understand the main drivers for this 
current state of the industry, the goal of this study is to advance the 
understanding of the relationship between an alliance that is established among 
two or more pharmaceutical firms and the effect that this will have on the R&D 
productivity of the merged or acquired firm. 
This study uses panel data from 1981 to 2017 and a series of OLS regressions 
to investigate the existence of any relationships and trends. As found in Chapter 
4, when the effect of a previous alliance or its determinants – alliance duration 
and number of drugs collaborated - on R&D productivity is being investigated, 
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negative coefficients are obtained, and results are significant for all variables 
except for the number of drugs collaborated. This result goes against the study 
by Porrini (2004) and Higgins and Rodriguez (2006) who find that a previous 
alliance between an acquirer and target firm generally improves acquisition 
performance. However, Porrini’s study has some particularities that may explain 
the conflicting results. Firstly, it focusses on a different time period (stops at 1997) 
and secondly, there is no focus on a specific industry, instead, the dataset 
includes public American firms. Regarding Higgins and Rodriguez (2006), even 
though their report is based on the pharmaceutical industry, they are not 
measuring any kind of R&D performance. Instead, the authors are looking at the 
change in cumulative abnormal returns around the time of the announcement of 
the merger or acquisition. Obviously, this is not an attempt to dispute the 
findings in these studies, nevertheless, it is important to note that different 
conclusions have been obtained from similar research questions.  
On the other hand, our findings are consistent with Uhlenbruck et al. (2006) 
and Zaheer et al. (2010) who find that alliances established prior to an acquisition 
do not pose a significant contribution towards future performance of the merged 
or acquiring firm. Additionally, Ornaghi (2006) finds that mergers and 
acquisitions lead to a negative effect in R&D productivity and intensity in the 
three years succeeding it. The author also posits that the general trend of 
consolidation in the pharma industry has contributed to a decrease in innovation 
capacity due to integration issues and loss of human capital that arise from 
M&As. Finally, Meschi et al. (2017) finds some mixed results showing that the 
effect of pre-acquisition alliances on future performance can either have a 
positive or negative effect depending on when the decision to acquire occurs.  
The existence of contradictory finding among scholars indicates that further 
research in this area should be pursued. Still, one explanation for the negative 
relationship between alliance and future R&D productivity may have to do with 
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the idea that the knowledge gained during the alliance period does not 
significantly benefit the acquirer firm in a strong enough way to support an 
increase in R&D productivity. Secondly, as mentioned during this report, an 
advantage of engaging in alliances is to foster information gathering similar to 
what happens during due diligence processes. However, if the alliance synergies 
are weak, little knowledge can be transferred and the acquiring firm becomes 
unable to access information that will allow it to identify the value of the target’s 
intangible assets. Zaheer et al., (2010) actually identify that the negative impact 
on acquisition performance is aggravated if the alliance is considered to be ‘weak’ 
in contrast to engaging in no alliance at all. Possible reasons for this may be that 
the administrative costs incurred in establishing and running the alliance are 
higher than the confidential information that is gained from it. Furthermore, 
LaMattina (2011) raises an interesting point to describe how research and 
development is one of the most vulnerable sectors during an organization’s M&A 
process. Due to intellectual property rights, patent protection, and sensitive data 
that are embedded in the R&D departments of pharmaceutical firms, these will 
be the last ones to engage in the integration processes. These departments will 
also have to undergo review processes which are extremely time-consuming to 
determine which projects will remain in the firms’ pipeline. This will ensure there 
is no process duplication and that the drug pipeline of the new company is 
aligned with its strategic direction. The author even states that during M&A 
proceedings, which may take 9 months, “generally no new programmes are 
started” (Lamattina, 2011, p. 560). 
In addition, the results yielded some strongly negative and significant results 
for cross border M&As, showing that R&D productivity is lower for M&As that 
occurred between firms from different countries. These results are consistent 
with Stiebale (2013), who finds that a cross-border M&A can produce a negative 
effect on R&D intensity if domestic activities are replaced with investments in 
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the target country. Looking back at the analysis by Munos (2009), he finds that 
M&As increase NME output for small firms but not for large firms. Since R&D 
productivity is calculated as the percentage of sales that is spent in R&D, both 
NME cost and output are accounted for in this ratio. However, even though this 
report finds a negative significant relationship between prior alliance and R&D 
productivity, it would be interesting to understand whether this is because fewer 
NMEs are being researched, whether the cost per NME is lower, or even both. 
Above all, the findings in this study confirm some existing empirical evidence 
regarding the effects of alliances on R&D productivity in the pharmaceutical 
industry, even though it is clear we are far from reaching a consensus on why 
this is the case. It may be that research and development expenditures fluctuate 
excessively, and in such a way that drawing relationships from its behaviour is 
reduced. On the other hand, it may be that engaging in M&As as a strategy for 
expansion, drug pipeline improvements, economies of scale and scope or tax 
savings is being cancelled out by the negative effects associated with M&As. 
These negative results may include integration problems, cultural shocks or lack 
of vision. Hence, the same can be inferred for the effect of alliances on future 
performance. Even though alliances clearly offer numerous advantages to an 
organisation, more specifically to its R&D departments, the effects they may 
reproduce in the post-M&A period may not be reflected immediately. It may be 
that a drug that is developed during an alliance between two firms prior to a 
merger will only have an impact on the firm’s R&D productivity some years later. 
Indeed, it may even be that it does not have any impact whatsoever. 
Consequently, it is clear that there is no definite relationship to be inferred from 
the effect of a pre-acquisition alliance on R&D productivity and this can be seen 
from the different conclusions reached by existing literature.  
In conclusion, by incorporating the concept of a pre-acquisition alliance and 
evaluating its effects on the R&D productivity of the subsequent merged or 
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acquired firm, and applying this concept to the pharmaceutical industry, this 
paper fills a gap in the existing literature. This study highlights the importance 
of collaborating prior to an M&A to minimize information asymmetry, and to 






As already mentioned, measuring R&D productivity still proves to be quite 
uncertain due to the difficulty in quantifying its determinants. Nevertheless, 
many researchers have chosen to use patent approval as a proxy for R&D 
productivity. This study uses a ratio of shareholder returns and sales over R&D 
spending instead, which may have had some influence in the results. If possible, 
future studies should include R&D productivity using patent approvals as a 
measure to account for this. 
Secondly, the alliance database used in this report had no unique identifiers 
(i.e. stock tickers) for the firms engaging in the alliances which hindered the 
retrieval of data from financial databases (e.g. Bloomberg, Thomson Reuters). 
Instead, most observations had to be manually matched to their identifiers in 
order to make data retrieval possible, which besides being time-consuming, 
increases the probability of human error. Following this limitation, the sample 
used in this study was limited to public firms to maximise the possibility that 
data could be easily found online. Clearly, the sample would become richer if 
private firms were to be used even though finding data might prove harder. 
Nevertheless, researchers with fewer time constraints should look into this 
limitation. 
Moreover, the data used for the empirical investigation is a panel dataset to 
allow for a dynamic relationship between the variables, since different variables 
reported to different time periods. However, since the effects from M&A activity 
may not be immediately reflected in the time period selected by this paper, a 
model with year-lags may be useful for implementation in future studies. 
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Finally, it would be interesting to have information detailing the nature of the 
alliances, more specifically, if they are equity or non-equity based. This would 
allow researchers to draw conclusions about whether the type of alliance is 
related to the degree of commitment towards the collaboration process, which 
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